


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Soviet Press Coverage of the President's Trip

The Soviet press has castigated the Chinese for their "vicious attacks" on the Soviet Union's detente policies during President Ford's visit, but has implicitly indicated satisfaction with the way the President has defended the improvement in US relations with the USSR.

The Soviets have reported all the President's remarks in defense of detente and even most of the explanations made by White House officials in support of the President's statements. For example, they reported that White House spokesman Ron Nessen said that the US does not intend to give way to China's pressure to change course, and they picked up the story that the White House was alarmed by Teng's first statement and considered inserting a tougher response to his remarks. The Soviets also reported that leading American newspapers indicate that the US will continue its efforts to reach agreements on strategic arms and other matters with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets expect China and the US to find common ground on some foreign policy problems. They also expect that there may be some additional progress on trade and scientific and cultural exchanges. On the whole, however, most Soviet officials seem to believe, and the press has so indicated, that there will be no significant improvement in Sino-US relations as a result of the visit.

The Soviets are nevertheless worried about speculation in the US regarding military cooperation with the Chinese. One broadcast on the so-called unofficial Radio Peace and Progress just prior to the President's visit noted that Peking had supported keeping American forces in Asia in the hope of getting something in return--specifically transport planes, armored carriers, tanks, and fighter planes.

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The Soviets are aware that China's present military forces--both conventional and strategic--pose no offensive threat to the USSR, but they are not sure that all Chinese recognize China's military inferiority and are appalled at the possibility that the US might share military technology with the Chinese. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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US Secretary of Agriculture
Butz's Visit to Poland

Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz was received with "genuine warmth" during his visit to Poland from November 25 to 28, according to the US embassy. The visit was given prominent coverage in the press and television. This kind of warm hospitality has become the norm over the last several years in US-Polish relations.

Poland's Minister of Agriculture Barcikowski gave Secretary Butz letters affirming Poland's intention to purchase two to three million tons of grain from the US in each of the next five years. In return, the US assured the Poles that they would have access to the US market. The Poles repeatedly asked for up to \$200 million from the Commodity Credit Corporation to cover Polish imports of US grains. The two sides also discussed US-Polish cooperation in the fields of joint scientific research in agriculture and cooperation in the food-processing industry.

Polish officials emphasized that they were eager to expand economic contacts with US firms. Vice Premier Jagielski--filling in for Prime Minister Jaroszewicz who was out of town--said Warsaw places great importance on its agricultural relations with the US. He also asserted that Poland is "determined" to expand its economic relations with the US across the board. The President of the State Council, Jablonski, told the Secretary that party leader Gierek had given his blessing to the rapid growth of cooperation with the US. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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